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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-vsROBERT WAYNE GLEASON,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
10289

BRIE,F OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE iCA:SE
Appellant appeals from a conviction of the crime of
rape in violation of Section 76-53-15(3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
DISPOSI T ION IN LOWER COURT
1

1

The appellant was tried upon jury trial for the crime
of rape in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the 17th day of July,
1964. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and the appellant was committed to the Utah State Prison. The

•
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appellant has prosecuted this appeal from the lower
court's judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the appellant's con.
viction by the trial court should be affirmed.
STkTEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following statement of
facts.
On April 14, 1963, at 10 :30 p.m., Miss Fawn Dotson
was standing on the corner of 13th South and State
Street in Salt Lake City, waiting for a bus (R. 72). She
observed the appellant, Robert Wayne Gleason, walk
across the street from 13th South toward her. The ap·
pellant approached Miss Dotson, walked behind her and
asked her if the bus had left yet (R. 77). She indicated
that it had not and after a car had stopped, and the occu·
pant had asked the appellant a question and left, the
appellant put a pistol against the back of Miss Dotson
and told her that if she didn't follow him, he would kill
her. She tried to jerk away from him and run, but he
grabbed her arm, held her, and told her that if she did
anything like that again, he would kill her (R. 78). He
forced her down to an alley where she started to screarn
and struck him with her purse. Her purse broke open
and several items fell on the ground (R. 79). There w~
a truck with a meat sign on it in the alley (R. 79) .

3

The appellant then threw Miss Dotson to the ground,
hit }in, choked lier, and tore her clothing from her body
(H. SU). 'l'liereafter, he raped her, making complete penftration (R. 81). Subsequently, the appellant fled and
Mis::: Dotson grabbed some of her clothing and returned
to her boy friend's house, where the police were called
(R. 8~).

A polie1~ inspection of the area of the attack revealed
that part of Miss Dotson's clothing was still at the scene
and items which had fall en from her purse (R. 94, 96).
Miss Dotson was taken to the Salt Lake County Hospital,
11-here sh(~ was examined and found to have abrasions,
bruises and scrakh<'s on the neck, breasts and thighs (R.
hi, G.~). Dr. David A. Hansen performed a routine pelvic
examination and removed live, viable sperm (R. 70). He
testified that the life of such sperm would be between
2-1: and 4-8 hours (R. 70). Miss Dotson testified at trial
that she had not had intercourse for at least two days
(R. 81).

Miss Dotson identified the appellant's pirture from police mug shots and further identified
thl- appellant at a police lineup (R. 83, 100, 103). Thereufter, the police recovered pants from the defendant's
wife -\\"hich resembled the pants Miss Dotson said her
ns:c:ailant Wa8 wearing. They contained mud on the side
::ind lrnres which resembled that found at the scene of
t li P erime (It 111, 112).
Snb~wquently,

NuhE;t~quent to the appellant's arrest and charge for
i)i,, cri.J11t>, lw was admitted to the Utah State Hospital

4

for psychiatric examination. He remained there for a
period of approximately one year before he was brought
to trial (R. 15). At the time of the trial, the appellant
did not take the stand and offered no evidence in his
behalf except the testimony of two psychiatrists. Dr.
Richard C. Gilmore testified that he observed the appellant at the State Hospital on June 10, 1963. At that
time the appellant appeared psychotic, suffering from an
acute schizophrenic reaction of a paranoid type (R. 1191
120). He testified that he could not determine whether
the appellant suffered from any mental disease on April
14, 1963, at the time the crime was committed. He could ,
not say whether at that time of the crime the appellant
suffered from any mental disease or defect or would be
legally insane (R. 120, 123, 125). He indicated that it
was possible that the arrest of the appellant could have
brought on his psychotic condition (R. 125). Dr. Roger
S.. Kiger, a psychiatrist at the Utah State Hospital,
testified that he observed the appellant from June 101
1963, to May 7, 1964, and during that time, the appellant's condition would vary from psychotic to normal.
He testified that he could not determine or give an opinion as to the appellant's mental condition on April 14,
1963, nor could he determine whether at that time the
appellant knew the difference between right and wrong,
the nature of the act he committed, or could resist from
committing the act (R. 134, 135). He testified that appellant's condition could change at the "snap of a finger"
(R. 136). He further indicated that at the time the appellant was admitted to the State Hospital, he diagnosed

5

his condition as acute schizophrenic reaction, paranoid
type (R. 129), but that the appellant admitted that he
had been feigning mental illness and that he felt there
was some attempt on the part of appellant to feign mental illness, but that his diagnosis was accurate (R. 136).
The trial court refused to submit the question of

appt>llant 's insanity to the jury on the grounds that the
evidence of insanity was too remote and speculative.
Based upon the above evidence, the jury returned a
vt>rdict of guilty to the crime of rape.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF INSANITY TO THE
.JURY.

The appellant contends that the trial court should
have submitted the issue of insanity to the jury. The
evidenee in this regard shows that the crime was committed on or about April 14, 1963. On June 10, 1963,
the appellant was examined by a psychiatrist at the
State Mental Hospital. .According to the two psychiatrists that testified, when they saw the appellant on June
10, 1963, he was suffering from an acute schizophrenic
reaction, paranoid type (R. 120, 129). In response to
questions concerning the appellant's condition on the
day the crime was committed, Dr. Richard C. Gilmore
t.,stified:

6

"Q.

Could you, from your examination, arrive at
a diagnosis as to his mental condition on 0;
about the 14th day of April, 19631

A.

I could not.

Q.

Now, Doctor, the description that you have
given to us of the defendant, Mr. Gleason do
these conditions develop, usually, over-ni~ht!

A.

I think this is within the realm of possibility.

Q.

As a general rule, then, Doctor, may we assume that his condition arises from various
things over a period of time 1
MR. BANKS: I will object to that as a
leading question, and also an asswnption,
rather than his opinion.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained;
you may restate your question.

Q.

Would it be your opinion, Doctor, that conditions such as Mr. Gleason's would develop
over a period of time¥

A. It is my opinion that this would be possible."
(R. 120, 121.)
On cross examination, he testified:

"Q. Did he. Now, at that time, could you m~e
a determination as to what his mental condi·
tion was on or about April 14, of 1964, based
on your examination¥
A.

I could not.

Q.

And, therefore, based on your examinailtion.
you couldn't tell whether or not, on Apr' 14'
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he could tell the difference between right and
wrong, both legally and morally, could you Y
A. I could not, sir.
Q.

Based on your examination, you couldn't tell
whether or not, on April 14, 1963, he would
know the nature of the acts of 'intercourse'
and 'forcible intercourse,' would you 1

A.

I could not testify to this, sir.

Q. And, at that particular time, you couldn't tell
whether or not, from your examination,
whether or not, on April 14, that he had a
diseased mind to such an extent that it would
prevent him from controlling his impulses?
A. I could not say so.

• • •

Q. ·would a person with this diagnosis - person
with this diagnosis - on occasion that is,
does know the difference between right and
wrong - legally and morally; isn't that cor,..
rect?
A.

This is possible, yes.

Q. It happens all the time, doesn't iU

A. I have observed this in this type of personabty.
Q. And this type of individual, on a given occasion, also, would know the nature of his
acts?
A.

Yes, sir.
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Q.

And, also, on such an occasion, he would know
the nature of having sexual intercourse; isn't
that true?

A. Yes, sir.
Q.

And, on occasions, individual of this tYPe
would also know the significance of forcing
intercourse with a person; isn't that correct!

A. Yes, sir.
Q.

And, on such occasions, even though a person
of this nature might have a diseased mind, he
would be able to control his impulses; isn't
that correct Y

A.

Would you restate that, please?

Q.

I say on such occasions-withdraw that question; rephrase it: On occasions, a person
with the diagnosis and with this same diagnosis, would be able to control their impulses1

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Now, the mere fact that a person is mentally
ill and hospitalized, Doctor, doesn't mean that
he doesn't know what he is doing, does itT

A.

In the broad, general term of 'mental illness/
this is true; yes, sir.

Q.

Well, conditions can vary from day to day of
a particular patient; isn't that trueY

• • •

A. Yes, sir."
Dr. Gilmore further testified that the incident of
being arrested might be sufficient to touch off appellant's condition (R. 126).
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Dr. Roger S. Kiger testified that he was the appellan t's physician at the State Hospital from June 10,
1963, to May 7, 1964. He testifed on direct examination:
"Q.

A.

Now, based upon your examination, were you
able to form an opinion or to arrive at a diagnosis as to Mr. Gleason's mental condition on
April 14, 1963?
I wasn't."

On cross examination he testified that when he first

examined the appellant on the 10th of June, 1963, he was
irrational, even though he was feigning symptoms and
was unreliabl<~ (R. 130-137). He further testified:
"Q.

A.

And, from none of your examination or diagno::::is, test::::, have you been able to form an
opinion as to this individual, as to whether
or not he morally or legally knew the difference between right and wrong as of April
14th of 1963, have you?
I could not form an opinion.

Q. And, with the same background, you have
never been able to form an opinion as to
whether or not, as of April 14th of 1963, he
did know the nature of the acts of intercourse ; is that correct?
A.

I would not know.

Q.

Or forcing someone to have an act of intercourse with him; is that correct?

A. Would you repeat the last part?

Q.

Yes; it is - it is a continuation of your prior
answer.

10
A.

That he would lmow?

Q.

That - yes, that he would lrn.ow the nature
of forcing someone to having intercourse with
him?

A.

As of April 14th?

Q.

As of April 14th?

A.

I have never been in a position to know.

Q.

And, as far as you lmow, he - you don't
know whether or not he could control his im.
pulses on April 14th, or not control them?

A.

I would not lrn.ow."

(R. 133, 134.)

'The doctor indicated that most of the time that appellant was committed to the State Hospital, he lrnew
the difference between right and wrong, lmew the nature
of his acts, and was capable of controlling his impulses.
In response to how fast the appellant's mental condition
could change, Dr. Kiger responded to the District At·
torney's questions as follows :

"Q.

Knowing what you do about this individual
and - isn't it true that individual could take
a flip-flop and be in as bad a condition as he
was on June 10 of 1963?

A.

By a definition of 'flip-flop,' in my mind, ther.
the snap of the finger, I would say, yes, he
could.

Q.

But he could revert back to that condition T

A.

Yes."

11
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l3li.)

i\ 0 L·vidPnce of any kind was offered by the appellant
frnin 11 i:-' acquaintances or relatives to the effect that

on tlt<' date the offense was conunitted, the appellant
eould not appreciate the nature of his acts, did not know
the di [fl>rence between right and wrong, and could not
aJhere to the right. Nothing in the testimony of the
prcsecutrLx was to the effect that the appellant would
haVl' cmmnitted the act even in the presence of deterring
autltorit)·. None of the police officers associated with
aw<·llant at the time of his apprehension testified to
noticing app(~llant exhibit any symptoms of insanity. The
appellant apparently attempted to commit the act in
an an•a where he would be least likely to be detected as
di~tinct from the area where he first approached the
prosu~utrix.

Although there is some evidence that appellant had
p:-;yehiatric treatment approximately one year to a year
and a half prior to the incident (R. 13), there is no showing that this psychiatric treatment was in any way related to the present incident or that at any time in the
past, vrior to the commission of the crime, had the appellant's conilition been indicative of legal insanity. There
i~ not one scintilla of evidence to indicate the appellant's
eondition at the time the crime was committed. It is well
t·~tahlished that in this State, in order for a defendant
to bP t>:x:cused from criminal misconduct, it must appear
that at the time the crime was committed, either (1) the
appellant did not know the nature of the act he was
r·nmmitting, or (2) he did not know that the act was
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wrong, or (3) he could not control his impulses. State i1,
Poulson, 14 U.2d 213, 381 P.2d 93 (1963); State v. Kirkham, 7 Utah 2d 108, 319 P.2d 859 (1958).
It is the general rule at common law that the mental
impairment of any defendant must appear to have existed
at the time the crime was committed. Williams, Criminal
Law, 2d Edition, The General Part, page 443. It is settled
that the evidence of any diminished faculty of an accused
must be related to the time of the crime. Wigmore, Evi
dence, 3rd Edition, Sec. 931.
It is well established that although the prosecution
bears the overall burden of proving a defendant's guilt,
it is presumed that a defendant in any criminal case is
sane and the burden of proof of going forward with
evidence to overcome the presumption rests upon the
defendant. In Wharton, Criminal Evidence, Vol. 1, 12th
Ed., Sec. 28, it is stated:

"* * * The prosecution has the burden of prov-

ing that the defendant had the capacity to commit
the crime charged, but it may initially rely on the
presumption of sanity. That is, since everyone is
rebuttably presumed sane, it will be assumed that
the defendant has sufficient capacity, and the
burden is upon him to prove that he is insane."
In State v. Brown, 36 Utah 46, 102 Pac. 641 (190!1).
this court observed:

"* * * No doubt the presumption of sanity in
the absence of any evidence to the contrary, make~
prima facie case in favor of sanity. It is, however.
a presumption of fact merely, and prevails unless
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overcome by countervailing proof. In this jurisdiction the burden of overcoming this preswnption
rests primarily upon the defendant. He is reqi~irr;d to overthrow it, by a preponderance of the
evidence offered in the case upon the subject.
( F~mphasis added.)
in State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135,
134 Pac. G32 (1913), the court had before it a conviction
of the appellant for the crime of murder in the first
degree. In affirming the judgment, the court held that
tlH~ evidence presented was not sufficient to warrant an
in:'itrnction to the jury on the issue of insanity and, con::leqm·ntly, no error from imperfect instructions could be
claimed. 1 The evidence in theM ewhinney case was substantially stronger than the evidence in the instant case
to the extent that it was directed to the condition of the
rlefrndant at the time the crime was actually committed.
In the instant case where the evidence would be speculative and remote, and where the jury had before it no
evidence as to the appellant's condition at the time the
crime was committed, it can hardly be said that the appellant carried his burden of going forward with suffie1ent evidence to indicate his insanity at the time of
trial. In State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 (1931),
this court ruled :
Suh~e4uently,

"* * '* Until evidence is offered and received
at tlrn trial which tends to show that the defendant was insane at the time of the alleged crime,
1

In State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 (1931), the court charactenz<>d the Mewhinney case as standing for the proposition: "That
!here was not sufficient evidence to entitle the defendant to go to the
Jury on the question of insanity." loc. sit. 593.
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the state may rely upon the presumption of sanity
and need not offer evidence to establish that fa.et.
In the absence of evidence, sanity is assumed to
exist without evidence of its existence." (Em.
phasis added.)
Although the court indicated that a defendant's burdPn
has been met when some evidence of insanity is intro.
duced, it noted that the evidence must "tend to show the
accused was insane at the time of the alleged offense."
There is no evidence of any kind tending to show
insanity at the time of the offense in the instant case.
The psychiatric testimony was neutral and, at least, one
psychiatrist indicated that the appellant's condition could
have been brought about by his arrest, and, further, av
pellant's condition could change with the "snap of a
finger."
The appellant argues, however, that since there is
some evidence that, within a period of 55 days after the
crime, the appellant was insane, the jury could infer
therefrom that the appellant was insane at the time thP
crime was committed. This argument overlooks two salient facts. First, the condition which the appellant wai
suffering from at the time he was first examined by the
doctors was a fluctuating one which could vary instan·
taneously. Second, appellant's involvement, suuseqmnt
to the commission of the crime, could have been respon·
sible for the later condition. The appellant's argument
is analogous to the presumption of continuing insanity.
There is a rule of law that where it is shown that an
individual is insane, it will be presumed that he continur'1
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to ri•main insane. 27 A.L.R.2d 121. In the instant case,
the appellant urges that some form of presumption that
the, appellant was insane at the time the offense was
committed can be indulged from the fact that he was
insane at some time subsequent to the offense. However,
the cases are virutally unanimous that no such presumption of e.ontinning insanity, even were it applicable to
this fad situation, arises where the nature of the mental
illnPss is spaRmodic. Thus, in 27 A.L.R.2d 121, at page
124, it is observed:
'' l\f o~t of the courts which have, in criminal
caRPs, recognized that presumption of continuing
insanity arises from proof that the accused was,
at a time earlier than that under investigation,
afflicted with insanity, have held that this presumption arises only where the earlier insanity
shown by the evidence was permanent, chronic,
or of a continuing nature, and not merely temporary or spasmodic."

Further, at page 135, it is stated:
"There is some basis (in the legal if not the
medical books) for drawing a distinction between
spells of insanity which are purely temporary or
spa~m1odic in nature, and those forms of insanity
where the affliction, while permanent and continuing, is cyclic in nature, so that the person affoded is subject to recurrent periods of insanity
se1iarated by lucid intervals. In a number of cases
it has been said that upon a showing that the defendant's prior insanity was interrupted by lucid
intervals, no presumption of continuing insanity
arisPs, and the burden is upon the accused to show
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his insanity at the time of committing the offense
charged.''
It is apparent, therefore, that there is no legal basis
for the appellant's contention that he met his burden of
going forward with the evidence by a showing of insanity
subsequent to the event. This evidence was substantially
remote to the time in question. 2 Since it was remote
and speculative, it was well within the province of the
trial judge not to present the matter to the jury. State
v. Schuman, 151 Kan. 749, 100 P.2d 706 (1940); 22 C.J.S.
Criminal Law, Sec. 639.
It is settled that it is not error for a court to fail to
give an instruction on insanity where the evidence is in.
sufficient to raise the issue for jury consideration. People
v. C111nningham, 245 P.2d 450 (Calif. 1926); People v.
Francis, 38 Calif. 183; United States v. Wilson, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 60, 25 C.M.R. 322 (1958).

In United States v. Regan, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 323, 27
C.M.R. 397 (1959), the appellant was convicted of the
crime of assault with a deadly weapon and the inten·
tional infliction of grevious bodily harm. Various wit·
nesses testified that the appellant's conduct was strange,
disturbed and sickly at the time of the commission of the
crime. The court ruled the evidence insufficient to war·
rant an instruction on insanity.
It is submitted that the court did not err in not in·
structing the jury on the issue of insanity where there
2See Moore v_ D_ & R.G.W. Ry., 4 U.2d 255, 292 P.2d 849, wher~ ~
court indicated that mere medical possibilities do not raise suff1cien
evidence for jury consideration.
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was not a scintilla of evidence as to the appellant's condi-

tion at the time the crime was committed.
Although the appellant does not raise the issue as
a point of error in his brief, he does note and challenge
the court's failure to give an instruction to the effect
that every criminal offense requires a union of act and
intent. The failure to give such an instruction could
hardly have prejudiced the appellant. The jury was expressly instructed by the Court's Instructions No. 8 and
No. 11 as to the requirement that the accused must willfully have committed the act. Rape is an offense which
does not require a specific intent but just a general intent
to conunit the act. Walden v. State, 178 Tenn. 71, 156
S.W.2d 305 (1941). Since the jury was otherwise appraised of the essential elements of the crime, the instruction on the union of act and intent was superfluous
and unnecessary. Further, since the point has not been
specifically raised on appeal, it is not properly before
the court.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON
THE OFFENSE OF ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO
COMMIT RAPE, BECAUSE:
(a)

THE REQUEST FOR SUCH AN INSTRUCTION WAS NOT TIMELY., AND

(b)

THE EVIDENCE DID NOT RAISE THE
ISSUE AS TO ANY LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE.

(a) At the time of trial the appellant requested an
mstruction on the question of assault with intent to com-
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mit rape (R. 138). ·The court refused such an instruction, noting that the question of request for instructioni
had been considered the previous evening and the only
request made at that time was for an instruction on as.
sault and battery. It is apparent, therefore, that the appellant did not make a timely request in accordance with
local court rules and cannot object to the failure of the
court to give the instruction as requested. People u.
Pearson, 150 Calif. App.2d 811, 311 P.2d 142; People t'.
Northum, 115 Calif. App. 2d 606, 252 P.2d 686.
(b) The evidence in the instant case clearly showi
that an assault took place on the person of Fawn Dotson.
The prosecutrix testified, without contradiction, that the
appellant effected penetration. Further, upon examination by a treating physician at the Salt Lake County Hospital, viable sperm was removed from the vaginal vaul!
of the prosecutrix. No evidence of any kind was introduced to dispute the fact of penetration or to weaken
the contention that the crime of rape had in fact been
consummated. The appellant himself remained silent on
the issue of the consummation of the crime. There wa'
no evidence to rebut the statement of the prosecutrix or
to raise any factual contest that the crime of rape itself
had not been committed. Under these circumstances, it
is clear that no issue as to the lesser included offemr
was raised.
It is admitted that assault with intent to comn1it
rape is lesser included within the crime of rape (Bini
v. Blythe, 20 Utah 378, 58 Pac. 1108), and although 1
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r,onvirtion of the lesser offense in the face of overwhelming evidence of the greater offense would stand because
thP defendant could not be harmed, still, there is no requirenwnt that a jury be instructed on lesser offenses
unless a n·asonable basis for the instruction appears
from tlw evidence. In State v. Angle, 61 Utah 432, 215
Pac. 531 (1923), this court stated:

"It is a well-settled rule that instructions as
to lower grades of the offenses charged should
be given when warranted by the evidence. It is
equally well settled that in a criminal prosecution
error cannot be predicated on the omission of the
trial court to instruct as to lesser grades of the
offense charged where there is no evidence to reduce the offense to a lesser grade. 1 Blashfield,
Instructions to Juries (2d Ed.) §408."
In State v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 Pac. 55 (1929), this

court again noted:

"It is a well settled rule that instructions as
to lower grades of the offense charged should be
given when warranted by the evidence. It is equally well settled that in a criminal prosecution error
cannot be predicated on the omission of the trial
court to instruct as to lesser grades of the offense charged, where there is no evidence to reduce the offense to a lesser grade."
In the same case, .Justice Straup, concurring, noted:
"I concur in the result. I concur in the general statement as announced in some of the texts
and cases that when there is no evidence to supJinrt a conviction of a lesser offense, a court is not

•

20

required to submit it to a jury, and concur in the
statement in the prevailing opinion that instruc.
tions as to lower grades of a charged offense,
when embraced and included therein, should be
given when warranted by evidence."
More recently, in State v. Mitchell, 3 U.2d 70, 278
P.2d 618 (1955), this court again reiterated the doctrine
that before a failure to instruct on a lesser included offense can be claimed as error, there must be "evidence
from which reasonable persons could conclude that the
lesser offense was committed." Therefore, unless there
was evidence of record that would allow "reasonable persons" to find that some lesser offense, such as assault
wi'th the intent to commit rape, was committed, the court
did not err in refusing to so instruct.
In People v. Abeyta, 134 Colo. 441, 305 P.2d 1063
(1957), the Colorado Supreme Court noted that the only
evidence be~ore the court in a forcible rape case showed
that the crime in fact had been committed. It ruled that
under such circumstances the failure to submit the lesser
included offense of assault with intent to commit rape
could in no way prejudice the defendant. The court ruled:
"• • • Under the record as made the defen·
. at
dants were guilty of forcible rape or' nothing
all. They contended they had no contact with the
prosecutrix, and were, as above stated, in Pueblo,
Colorado. The only evidence before the jury ~as
that a rape had been committed, and we per~ve
no error in the refusal of the trial court to give
defendants' tendered Instruction No. 1."
1

·
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Jn People v. Cardaropali, 115 Calif. App.2d 235, 251
P.2d 692 ( 1953), the court observed:
"• • • The evidence disclosed a rape and not
mere attempt. While the defendant struck the
complaining witness this was incidental to the
commission of the rape, and it is inconceivable
that the jury could have believed that part of the
complaining witness' testimony without believing
the rest of it. The defendant relied entirely on
the contention that he was not there, and having
rested his case on that ground he is in no position
to complain that a miscarriage of justice resulted
from any failure to instruct the jury with respect
to the inclusion of a lesser offense. People v.
Meichtry, 37 Cal.2d 385, 231 P.2d 847; People v.
Ross, 89 Cal.App. 132, 264 P. 314. There was no
evidence which would tend to reduce the offense
from that charged in the information, the defense
offered no evidence contradictory to that offered
by the prosecution in this regard, and neither
error nor prejudice appears from the court's failure to give such an instruction on its own motion."
a

In State v. Brown, 16 U.2d 57, 395 P.2d 727 (1964),
the appellant was convicted of the crime of rape. The
evidence of the actual commission of the crime of rape
was less solid than that now before the court. On appeal
it was argued that the trial court erred in not giving an
instruction on the lesser included offense of assault with
intent to commit rape (See Brief of Respondent, Gase
No. 10067). The court, in passing upon the case on appeal, summarily rejected the argument without discussion, finding the issue was unmeritorious.
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It is apparent, therefore, that the issue in the instant
case raises no basis for relief on appeal.

CONCLUSION
The facts in the instant case clearly show the com.
mission of the crime of rape. The appellant's contention
that the trial court should have instructed the jury on
the lesser included offense is at best frivolous. The argument that the jury should have been allowed to speculate as to the appellant's mental condition at the time
of the commission of the offense has no valid foundation in law or in fact. There was not a scintilla of evidence except mere speculation alone that the accused
was insane at the time of the commission of the instant
offense. The record is devoid of evidence going to the
elements of legal insanity at the time the offense was
committed. Further, the psychiatric testimony does not
demonstrate any positive evidence that the accused was
insane at the time of the commission of the offense sufficient to overcome the presumption of insanity.
The trial court acted properly in not leaving to the
jury a matter which had only conjecture to support it.
This court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant
Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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